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Abstract
The Debian project is one of the largest free software undertakings worldwide. It is geographically distributed, and
participation in the project is done on a voluntary basis, without a single formal employee or directly funded person.
As we will explain, due to the nature of the project, its authentication needs are very strict - User/password schemes
are way surpassed, and centralized trust management schemes such as PKI are not compatible with its distributed
and flat organization; fully decentralized schemes such as the OpenPGP Web of Trust are insufficient by themselves.
The Debian project has solved this need by using what we termed a “curated Web of Trust”.
We will explain some lessons learned from a massive key migration process that was triggered in 2014. We will
present the social insight we have found from examining the relationships expressed as signatures in this curated
Web of Trust, as well as a statistical study and forecast on aging, refreshment and survival of project participants
stemming from an analysis on their key’s activity within the keyring.
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1 Introduction
The Debian project is among the most veteran surviv-
ing free software projects; having been founded in August
1993 by Ian Murdock [1], it has grown to be one of the
most popular Linux distributions by itself, as well as the
technical base for literally hundreds of others. It is the only
distribution that produces an integrated operating system
capable of running on different operating system kernels -
Although an overwhelming majority of Debian users use
Linux, it has been ported to the FreeBSD and GNUHURD
kernels as well [2–4].
But besides all of its technical characteristics, what
makes Debian really stand out as a project is its social
composition: it is, since its inception, a completely
volunteer-driven, community-run project, with very big
geographic dispersion [5–7]. Participants in the project
have a shared set of emergent cultural values, some of
which have been extensively documented [8].
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Since Debian’s early days, cryptographically strong iden-
tification was deemed necessary to guarantee the security
guarantees Debian’s users have; as the project grew, a
viable trust management strategy had to be envised as
well; we call it the curated Web-of-Trust model [9].
But cryptographic parameters that were deemed safe
for long-term use in the mid nineties are now considered
to be unsafe. By 2014, the Debian project underwent a
large key migration to keep up with the security recom-
mendations for the following years [10]. We described the
full reasoning for this migration and an overview of the
process and its numeric impact in the project in [9].
The aforementioned migration prompted a study of
the direct metrics of the keyring’s health, such as those
detailed by [11], as well as a more transdisciplinary analy-
sis of the keyring as a social network.
Throughout this work, we will present an overview of
the trust aging that had started manifesting since around
2010, as well as its forceful re-convergence, and a statisti-
cal analysis on key survival expectations.
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2 Background
In this section, we present background information
needed for better understanding of what prompted our
work, the process underwent by the Debian project that
prompted for a fuller analysis to gain understanding of the
keyring itself.
Throughout this section, a set of Research Questions
(RQs) are presented, which guide the discussion that
follows.
2.1 Trust models in public key cryptography
Besides encryption and signing, public key cryptogra-
phy provides several models for identity assessment,
called trust models. The most widespread model is
the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) model, a hierarchi-
cal model based on predetermined roots of trust and
strictly vertical relationships (certificates) from Certifi-
cation Authorities (CAs) to individuals. This model is
mostly known for being the basis for the ssl and
tls protocols, providing among others secure commu-
nication between Web browsers and servers using the
https protocol.
As we have presented [9], the Debian project, being geo-
graphically distributed and with no organizational hierar-
chy, bases its trust management upon the Web of Trust
(WoT) model, with an extra step we have termed cura-
torship. The WoT model has been an integral part of
OpenPGP since its inception [12]. For this model, there is
no formal distinction between nodes in the trust network:
all nodes can both receive and generate certificates (or, as
they are rather called in the WoT model, signatures) to
and from any other node, and trust is established between
any two nodes that need to assert it by following a trust
path that hopefully links them in the desired direction and
within the defined tolerable distance [11]. This leads to the
first research question this work attempts to answer:
RQ1 Being Debian such a long-lived project, how does
its trust model endure time? Does aging qualitatively
challenge it?
Beside the aforementioned work, several other works
have studied the information that can be gathered from
the total keyring in the SKS keyserver network1 [13]. The
work we will present in this paper is restricted to a small
subset thereof - As of December 2016, the SKS network
holds over 4 million keys, while the active Debian keyrings
hold only around 1500.
2.2 Cryptographic strength
Public key cryptography works by finding related val-
ues (typically, very large prime numbers). The relation
between said numbers, thanks to mathematical problems
that are hard enough to solve to be unfeasible to be
attacked by brute force, translates to the strength of the
value pair.
Over the years since the public invention and publica-
tion2 of public key cryptography [14], several algorithms
for finding and relating said numbers have been incorpo-
rated into the Digital Signature Standard [15]; currently,
the most widely used are RSA (based on the integer fac-
torization problem; [16]) and DSA (based on the discrete
logarithm problem; [17]).
Said schemes’ strength is directly related to the size of
the numbers they build on. Back in the 1990s, when Inter-
net connectivity boomed and they first became widely
used [12], key sizes of 384 through 1024 bits were
deemed enough; using longer keys demanded computing
resources beyond what was practical at the time.
Of course, computers become more powerful con-
stantly; cryptographic problems that were practically
unsolvable 10 or 20 years ago are now within the reach of
even small organizations ([10], p. 11). Cryptographic keys
used for RSA and DSA algorithms should now be at least
2048 bits, with 4096 becoming the norm.
By 2009 (when the need to migrate to stronger keys
was first widely discussed within the Debian project) the
amount of 1024-bit keys was close to 90% of the total
keyring; the upcoming need of migration was repeatedly
discussed, and due to the threat of an attack becoming fea-
sible for a medium-sized organization ([10], pp. 30,32), by
July 2014 a hard cutoff line for expiring keys shorter than
2048 bits was set for January 2015, setting a six month
period for key migration. We published a analysis on that
migration process [9], which prompted the present work.
2.2.1 Cryptographic certificates in the Debian project
Not many free software projects started in the 1990s
are still active today, but those that are tend to be very
large and important. One such case is Debian; as men-
tioned in Section 1, the project was founded in 1993.
Although the vast majority of its developers did not join
until many years later, as we will explain in Section 5, many
developers have been active for over a decade.
Being Debian a globally distributed project, where
any project member is trusted to perform unsupervised
uploads that will ultimately be installed and executed in
millions of computers worldwide, the needed level of trust
in a member’s identity clearly surpasses what the tradi-
tional username-password pair offers; Debian Developers
have used the cryptographic signature as their means of
authentication to project services since its early days ([18],
pp. 18–20).
Even more, key signing parties (KSPs, sessions where
each participant verifies the other participants’ identity, to
later produce a cryptographic certificate or signature of
the identity, thus strengthening the WoT, further studied
in Section 3) ([18], p. 11) have been a long-standing tradi-
tion and are acknowledged as a social ties building event
at developer conferences and gatherings.
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Exchanging key signatures can be a challenging event
for newcomers to a community, as can be seen following
the exploration and proposal by [19]. Even within a com-
munity as tech-savvy as Debian is, we feel it important to
understand how useful and how effective KSPs are. Thus
the following research question:
RQ2 What is the actual effectivity of KSPs for Debian?
Are they worth fostering and keeping, or should an alter-
native trust-building model be sought?
A long-time, socially active developer’s key can often be
signed by hundreds of people, and the more signing activ-
ity a given key has, themore central it becomes to theWoT
(it becomes a trust hub).
While key migration pace did see a strong increase past
July 2014, full project participation was effectively cut for
252 developers - that is, about a fourth of the project. Two
and a half years later, there were still 167 keys marked as
removed that have not been acted upon. We analyze this
process at [9]; for the present work, suffice it to say that
analyzing this migration process was instrumental in the
analysis to be presented.
Our hypothesis is that, even considering the global dis-
persion of the project, the removed keys mostly belong to
people who had already drifted away from their project
engagement and were inactive; the upcoming Section 4
discusses how this can be understood (and even pre-
dicted) from the WoT, even analyzing it years before the
migration took place; social practice in Debian makes
it hard to determine when a developer is no longer
active; although there is a formal process for following
up seemingly-inactive developers, [20, 21] given the high
amount of human work it requires, it has so far not
reached enough coverage.
A process enhancement, automating a good part of the
needed follow-up and providing a simple interface for
inactive developers to signal they are effectively inactive,
has been recently enabled [22]; this change is too recent
to be accurately reported, but during the first month after
its implementation, it has led to 20 developers to acknowl-
edge they are no longer active in the project. Sixteen of
them had 1024-bit keys, which means they had been inac-
tive in most substantive project activities3 for at least two
and a half years already.
This process brings up yet another question: Given that
both due to challenges brought up by advances regarding
cryptographic strength, and by shifts in priorities or time
availability in the lives of the members of the project will
most likely continue to create fluctuations in each person’s
interactions with the project, can anything be learnt from
past behaviour to help it cope with future fluctuations?
Hence,
RQ3 From the data gathered, processed and presented
as part of this work, what insights on future behaviour of
the keyrings be found via statistical means?
2.3 Threats to validity
This article is based exclusively on the Debian Curated
Web of Trust, it does not relate to or cover any other
project’s keyring. This is mainly because, to the best of
our knowledge, there just is no other project which imple-
ments a CWoT in a similar fashion. As we explain in
Section 2.2.1, the practice of exchanging key signatures
is strongest in the Debian project, it does exist in other
free software communities, but not with the same strength
exhibited in Debian. Even just by sheer size, the footprint
of @debian.org mail addresses in the SKS network is
larger than most countries [13].
As for other groups that could be comparable, we could
find the image of a community in several free software
projects (such as Tor, Fedora, OpenBSD). However, said
communities do not use a keyring as an integral part of
their infrastructure. That is, there is no curation process
to them, and access is not granted based on whether an
individual presents a key that belongs to a given keyring.
It should be noted, the authors have started talking
with a well recognized free software development project,
which will possibly adopt curation and privilege-granting
processes similar to Debian’s. We do not want to commit
them, so we have chosen not to name them.
We have been approached with questions regarding
the analysis of the keyring blobs described in Section 4.
Graphically interpreting a graph such as the ones prompt-
ing this study (Fig. 3) might not be meaningful; the
shape of the blob itself could be an artifact of spe-
cific nodes ordering. In order to address this question,
we tried reversing and randomizing the nodes in the
graphviz source files, and found our observations to be
sustained. We also switched the rendering engine to
the JavaScript-based visjs, and found it to be sta-
ble. However, the analysis is still ocular; we have not
performed any numerical analysis that can confirm our
hypothesis.
As for Fig. 4, a similar question arises when considering
overplotting: Are the colors we see a faithful represen-
tation, or is there hidden information underneath? Even
more, is the color choice correct? As we mention in
Section 4, some colors are more visible than others. For
this question, we also compared the resulting plots to plots
done with the edges presented in different order and with
different colors; the results are coherent with what we
present.
3 Measuring key signing parties (KSPs)
Given we are already using the developers’ keyring to
measure social engagement, connectedness and activity of
individuals, it makes sense to study the KSPs. We will thus
proceed to compare the size, progression and reach of
the KSPs held at the Debian yearly developer’s conference,
DebConf (DC).
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Before starting with this session’s analysis, we must
point out this section was written not only based on
properties obtained from the data set, but with personal
knowledge of one of the authors having been a partici-
pant and organizer of DebConf for most of its editions;
we explain some observed trends based on insights of the
Debian project community that cannot be supported by
formal reference material.
Of course, KSPs are not only held at DC; a long-standing
tradition is for developers to announce in the debian-
private mailing list their travel plans, and it is customary
for them to explicitly mention meeting their peers to
exchange key signatures. There are also formal KSPs at
different free software meetings. But for the purposes of
our study, we decided to focus on the largest and more
representative events.
We have analyzable data for the past twelve DC editions.
Attendance to DC (and participation in its KSPs) varies
by several factors, mainly the geographical location and
the world (as well as each country’s) economic conditions,
but we will present some hypotheses as to some observed
trends. The number of participants per each DC edition,
as well as the proportion of its participants who were part
of the KSP is shown in Fig. 1.
Part of the attendee and KSP participation data are quite
natural, and are well known and discussed within the
Debian community: throughout the years, the conferences
with highest attendance are those held in locations clos-
est to large concentrations of Debian developers - Table 1
shows the location where each of the DC conferences has
been held since 2006, as well as the absolute numbers used
for Fig. 1, sorted by its number of attendees.
We say this distribution is natural because the most
attended DCs (15, 17 and 7) were held close to impor-
tant developer density population centers, and the lowest
Table 1 DebConf edition, location, number of attendees,
number of KSP participants, and number DDs in the KSP for each
DebConf since 2006, sorted by its number of attendees
DC Location Attendees KSP DDs
15 Heidelberg, Germany 581 282 145
17 Montreal, Canada 405 155 104
7 Edinburgh, Scotland 394 179 63
11 Banja Luka, Bosnia 335 139 91
14 Portland, United States 314 123 86
10 New York, United States 301 161 105
13 Vaumarcus, Switzerland 290 139 72
16 Cape Town, South Africa 282 130 85
6 Oaxtepec, Mexico 259 154 69
9 Cáceres, Spain 246 179 62
8 Mar del Plata, Argentina 223 76 29
12 Managua, Nicaragua 161 65 39
Fig. 1 Number of participants per each DebConf, showing the
proportion (in black, as well as in the label) of those who were part of
the key signing party
attendances (12, 8) were held in countries further away.
Given the developer density in the United States, atten-
dance for DC 10 and 14 rate seems low; this might be
caused by several developers not willing travel there due to
their ideological positions, or unable to do so, due to their
national origin. We found it surprising to find only 246
people attended DC 9, held in Western Spain, in a region
that between 2002 and 2013 pioneered free software
development [23]; its number, however, is close enough to
the following most attended, 6 and 16, to require further
information to explain their relative sizes - Issues such as
economic conditions on the relevant year ([24], p. 26) or
even perceived ease to travel to the destination.
Not every attendee to the conference takes part in the
KSP. Looking at the proportion of attendees who signed
up to participate shows also an interesting picture. Only
three times KSP participation has had over half of the
attendees (DC 9, with 72.76%, 6, with 59.46%, and 10, with
53.49%). Other than those three occurrences, participa-
tion has remained in a fairly narrow 15% band, between
34 and 49%.
Not all participants in DC, nor in the KSP, are for-
mal members of the Debian project (Debian Developers).
Figure 1 captures this as well. We find some interesting
patterns when looking at both relations; the match is not
perfect: we counted each key as belonging to a DD if it
had an identity with an @debian.org mail address. Some
(few) DDs are known not to add this identity to their key
material.
DC 9 was quite outstanding as it is by far the conference
with least non-KSP participants, although it keeps a high
proportion of non-DD participants. This can relate to the
economic recessionmentioned in ([24], p. 26): while fewer
Debian Developers attended the conference than usual, it
was held in a region with high free software involvement;
looking at the list of participants, it contains a high num-
ber of local people affiliated with different Free Software
projects.
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DC 7, 8 and 9 have the lowest percentage of DDs in
the KSP. This can be caused by the aftereffects of the
Transnational Republic experiment carried out in DC 6:
a DD, well known and well connected to the WoT, pre-
sented a seemingly official ID document generated by
a fictional non-government, the Transnational Republic
experiment [25, 26]. This incident led to an important dis-
cussion within the project and a change in the way KSPs
were held after said conference. As this clearly showed,
this had the result of socially diluting the responsibility
of verifying each other (that is, if everybody has checked
somebody’s identity, each participant does only a very cur-
sory look on the documents. Given KSPs were already
over 150 participants long, expecting thoroughness was
clearly unrealistic.
Now, how significant are KSPs to the connectedness of
their participants? Not everybody in a keyring cross-signs
during a KSP. In fact, until the aforementioned incident
in DC 6, the KSP protocol in Debian used to be for every
participant to form two lines, having ID documents ready,
and cross-check every other participant’s identity.
From DC7 onwards, keysigning sessions are held in a
continuous KSP fashion: after an initial session where a
document stating the key for the full document with the
keys of every participant is verified to be correct and the
same for every KSP participant, attendees are encouraged
tomeet and have a relaxed talk and introduction with each
other. Of course, the amount of cross-signatures every
person will get is much smaller than with the two-line
model, but they are also of greater significance.
After DC 9, the keyring maintenance team started rais-
ing awareness of the need to migrate to stronger keys, as
explained in Section 2.2.1 and detailed at length in [9];
we infer that raised the need to reconnect newer, stronger
keys into the keyring, as the high DD participation in KSPs
starting at DC 10 shows.
Considering this, how effective are KSPs to build trust
in keyrings? To this effect, we measured the ratio between
total signatures and keys on each KSP’s keyring (that is,
the average percentage of the keyring each key is directly
connected to), at the date of the KSP session itself, and
weekly for the following 15 weeks; this can be seen in
Fig. 2.
KSP effects are not immediate; participants are encour-
aged to print out a copy of the base document at home,
from a computer system they ultimately trust; the first
thing shown by Fig. 2 is how long does it usually take
to KSP participants to sign, send, receive and upload the
keys: while there is a big variation in the initial three
weeks, changes quickly converge and change past said
period is very minor.
As for the total connectedness for each of the KSP
keyrings, the inner increment is quite sensible for all
cases during the observed period; DC 7 shows the least
Fig. 2 Average percentage of KSP directly connected to each key by
KSP at the KSP date, and weekly for the following 15 weeks
improvement, increasing the average percentage of keys
signed directly from each key from 14.55 to 21.45 (a 47%
increase). A hypothesis towards such a small increase
could be that DC 7 was held in Scotland. The Debian-
UK community, predominantly centered in Cambridge,
is very large and tightly knit socially from the very early
days of the project. The KSP started off with a very well
connected keyring, and although this has been one of the
largest conferences in the project history and the total
participants in the KSP is the second highest, being this
the first KSP after the Transnational Republic experiment
mentioned above, it follows that many people would be
reluctant to sign keys from people they weren’t already
familiar with.
Two years later, the KSP had the biggest increase: DC
9’s keyring went from 3.20 to 11.55, a 261% increase.
Do note that, although it was the smallest conference in
Europe, Table 1 shows the absolute numbers for the KSP
were coincidentally equal to DC 7’s, and the proportion of
DDs was almost equal. We think this might be explained
because many of the DDs who attended DC 9 were not
strongly connected to the project, in contrast with the
mentioned situation of Debian-UK.
Table 2 compares the starting and ending points shown
in Fig. 2. We find it striking that DC editions that would
suggest very different settings are so close together - DC
7 and 8 are close to each others’ antithesis; second largest
and second smallest KSPs, DC7 in one of the DD-densest
countries and DC8 in a very DD-sparse region; so are
DC12 and DC15.
As mentioned at the beginning of the present Section,
most of the explanations of phenomena depending on
social interaction are just hypotheses; we have to acknowl-
edge several data are within the range for uncertainty to
play a heavy hand.
4 Trust aging and reestablishment
The work done for the described keyring migration, as
well as the migration process itself, presented a great
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Table 2 Increase of the average number of signatures 16 weeks
after a KSP
DC Partic. DDs (%) Begin End Increase %
7 179 102 (57) 14.55 21.45 6.90 47
8 76 47 (62) 14.99 25.34 10.35 69
16 130 86 (66) 6.82 11.58 4.76 69
12 65 39 (60) 14.72 27.25 12.53 85
15 282 145 (51) 3.48 6.46 2.98 85
6 154 76 (49) 9.34 19.69 10.35 110
14 123 87 (71) 6.12 13.25 7.13 116
11 139 91 (65) 8.64 20.27 11.63 134
13 139 72 (52) 7.00 17.13 10.13 144
10 161 105 (65) 4.22 12.59 8.37 198
9 179 112 (63) 3.20 11.55 8.35 260
Table shows DebConf edition, absolute number of KSP participants, the portion of
them that were DDs (as well as the percentage they are of the total), beginning and
ending averages of directly connected keys in KSPs, with the proportion of increase
seen in that KSP (absolute and percentage). The table is presented sorted by the
increase percentage
opportunity to understand the key migration as a social
phenomenon as well, using the keyring as a way to mea-
sure social cohesion and vitality.
We prepared graphic representations of the keyring at
its various points in time, in the hope to learn from it
patterns about its growth and evolution that can warn
about future issues. For the trust-mapping graphs, we
use directed graphs, where each key is represented by
a node and each signature by an edge from the signer
to the signee. For starters, we were interested in assert-
ing whether the characteristics observed on the whole
OpenPGP WoT [11] repeated in the subset of it repre-
sented by the Debian keyrings. Of course, said work was
done as a static analysis on the keyring back in 2011; back
then, the whole OpenPGP keyring stood at 2.7 million
keys; at the time of this writing there are 4.5 million keys,
growing by 100 to 400 keys every day [27].
Figure 3 presents seven snapshots of the main develop-
ers keyring, processed by Graphviz using the neato layout
program, which implements the spring minimal energy
model [28]. Of course, at the scale they are presented,
each individual edge or node becomes irrelevant; there is
too much density at the center, and the outlying nodes
and edges appear as just noise. However, the shape of the
strong set4 does lend itself to analysis.
Figure 3a, b and g present a regular shape, approximately
following Ulrich’s observations, that the strong set of the
WoT exhibits scale-freeness. Quoting ([11], Section 4.3),
Connectivity-wise, scale-free graphs are said to be
robust against random removal of nodes, and
vulnerable against the targeted removal of hubs (which
a b
c d
e
g
f
Fig. 3 Snapshots of the Debian keyring evolution at different points
in time. a January 2009 b January 2010 c January 2011 d January 2012
e January 2014 f December 2014 g January 2015
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leads to partitioning). This is usually explained by the
hubs being the nodes that are primarily responsible for
maintaining overall connectivity.
Ulrich notes that theWoT graph is similar to a scale-free
one and exhibits a hub structure, but is not scale-free in the
strict sense.
Something happened, however, in the course of 2010
that led to the WoT acquiring the shape shown in Fig. 3c
by the end of the year - Instead of a seemingly uni-
form blob, there is a distinct protuberance. This horn
grew throughout the following years, and by 2014, the
keyring consisted of two roughly equivalent blobs some-
what weakly linked together, as Fig. 3d and e show.
We find this protuberance to be the portrait of a social
migration: The project is often portrayed as unique among
free software projects due to the close personal ties among
developers; its yearly developers’ conference, DebConf,
has a very high repeating attendance rate. However, given
the project has lived for over 20 years, it is understand-
able many of the original members have grown inactive
andmoved on to other life endeavors; formal retirement is
requested from developers, but many people reduce their
engagement gradually, and just never formally retire.
While the geographical dispersion makes it quite hard
for some developers to meet others and obtain new cer-
tificates, as we already mentioned there is a tradition in
Debian to announce travels in a (private, developers-only)
mailing list, and active developers often will gladly meet
people traveling to their region just for a key signature
exchange.
Although the number of developers that by late 2010
had migrated to a stronger key was still quite small, the
call for key migration was initially answered by those
with most active key activity -hence, probably more con-
scious about the importance of this migration. Of course,
although it was not a targeted removal, it was a socially
self-selected one: trust hubs were among the first to
migrate to stronger keys. And even though they attempted
to re-build their WoT relationships and cross-sign with
other developers at gatherings such as DebConf, the group
of developers that -as explained in Section 4- had drifted
away from project activity didn’t reconnect with them.
While the migration to keys longer than 1024 bits took
much longer than originally expected, the initial push
was not bad: during 2010, it reached from practically
zero to close to 10% of the keys - But many of those
keys were hubs, people long involved in the project, with
many social bonds, and thus very central keys. When
those people migrated to newer keys, the signatures link-
ing their long-known fellow developers to the project
were usually not updated, and several old keys could have
even become islands, gradually losing connectivity to the
strong set.
Given Debian’s longstanding practices, rather than iso-
lated, many such keys started drifting apart as a block,
growing separated from the center of mass. This explains
why the migration started as a lump to later become two
large, still somewhat strongly connected bodies, mostly
stable over the years. Of course, as more developers
migrated to strong keys, by late 2014 the remaining group
started losing cohesion, and by December 2014 (before
it was completely removed), it is barely noticeable - All
of its real hubs had migrated to the new center of mass,
with many previously connected keys becoming isolated,
as Fig. 3f shows.
In order to prove this hypothesis, we generated again
the same graphs, but factoring in the trust aging: if indi-
vidual signatures are colored by their age, it is possible
to visually identify if a significant portion of the group’s
trust is aging - That is, if social bonds as reflected by
intra-key signatures are over a given edge. The seven sub-
figures of Fig. 4 correspond with those of Fig. 3, but with
color-coded edges (according to the image caption)5.
Surprisingly, even Fig. 4b shows a clear grouping of keys
by signature age - But this grouping does not appear a
year earlier, in Fig. 4a. This can, again, be indicative that
the first people to migrate to stronger keys, even before
it altered the overall shape of the WoT, migrated during
2009; by early 2010, they might constitute the tight, new
(blue) group still in the periphery, that eventually became
the core of the newer blob.
5 Statistical insights on the keyring history
Following from the same data set, we started a further
statistical analysis; this section presents the preliminary
results we gathered from applying survival analysis tech-
niques.
The general focus of survival analysis is on the model-
ing the time it takes until a specific event occurs, in social
sciences one often speaks of event history [29]. We have
found interesting findings from studying how many peo-
ple keeps participating in the Debian project throughout
the time, that is, to model the time until departure from
the Debian project. The main motivation comes from the
need to understand keyring population along time and
from the the implications of survival as reliability of sub-
jects (it is more likely for someone to be trusted if they’ve
been long enough in a community), thus arising a rough
measure for trust. Our sampled data is defined by the
keys that make up the curated WoT from the Debian
Developers keyring [9].
The analyzed data is treated as a longitudinal study.
We point out that intervals are not of the same length
in time: each data point is a tag in the keyring’s Git his-
tory,6 and the period of analysis spans between July 2008
and July 2016. During said period, 124 tags were recorded,
averaging to 23.96 days each, with a standard deviation
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a b
c d
e f
g
Fig. 4 Snapshots of the Debian keyring evolution at different points
in time, showing signature age: blue, ≤ 1 year; green, between 1 and
2 years; yellow, between 2 and 3 years; orange, between 3 and 4
years; red, ≥ 4 years. Signature coloring is relative to each of the
snapshots: blue edges in a represent signatures made throughout
2008. a January 2009 b January 2010 c January 2011 d January 2012 e
January 2014 f December 2014 g January 2015
of 27.95, with a maximum of 69 days and a minimum of
one day.
Given the way the keyring is structured, we used the long
key ID (the lowest 64 bits of its fingerprint, in hexadec-
imal representation) as a unique identifier for each key.
For each tag and key we counted the number of signatures
made to that key by counting the number of non-zero
entries in the corresponding key column of an adjacency
matrix at a specified tag.
We identified people’s participation in Debian using
their key activity record (has the key stopped getting sig-
natures?) and keyring membership (has the key stopped
being part of the keyring of interest?) which codes our data
as right-censored because no further information about
keyring membership is known afterwards; right censoring
scheme constitutes data where all that is known is that the
individuals are still alive (the keys are still active) at a given
time, [30].
For this analysis, in order to make a key-to-person
correspondence, we considered key ownership using the
following equivalence relation: keys are equivalent (i.e.
they refer to the same person) if they have the same meta-
data. We considered that using the name as metadata was
naturally appropiate to make a distinction among people.
We used the R programming language mainly lever-
aging routines from survival and flexsurv pack-
ages; unless otherwise stated, significance level is assumed
to be 5%.
Our line of approach begans showing the propor-
tion of remaining people in the keyring along time
through the survival function, that is, keyring perma-
nency. Then, using the accumulated hazard function, we
get the expected exits per person that remains in the
keyring until the end time (in perpetuity). And lastly, using
the hazard rate function, we get the departure rate from
the keyring.
For the non-parametric or observed curves we used
the Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator for the sur-
vival function, [31], the Nelson-Aalen moments estimator
for the accumulated hazard function [32], and the kernel
density estimator for the hazard rate function, [33].
A parametric estimation to see the mortality law fitting
our data was made using a Generalised Gamma dis-
tribution through maximum-likelihood estimation [34].
The motivation for using the Gen. Gamma model is
due to the closeness and confidence band coverage it
has to the observed hazard rate function obtained non-
parametrically. Proper justification for said model comes
from the fact that it minimizes Akaike’s Information Cri-
terion when compared to the other models, making it
a better model in terms of information loss, [35], while
also rejecting other models using a log-likelihood test of
-1422.395 at 3 degrees of freedom, [36]. The estimated
parameters found for our model were μ = 2.399, σ =
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0.2722, Q = 2.5594, with standard errors of 0.0719,
0.1432, 1.3519 respectively.
Finally to make inference about the effect of received
signatures as a predictor for survival, we used a semi-
parametric model using the Cox Proportional Hazards
model [37] by taking the average number of signa-
tures received by a person as a covariate. The estimated
regressor for the avg. num. of signatures received was
β = −0.00839, with a standard error of 0.0024 and
a p-value of 0.0046. Proper verification for the propor-
tional hazard assumption for the avg. num. of signatures
received was done testing the Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals
[38] against a Schoenfeld Individual Test which yielded a
p-value of 0.1617. This means the average number of sig-
natures received by someone has a statistically significant
risk contribution at any given time [39].
In the non-parametric plot of Fig. 5, we observe down-
ward stepswhenat least one people stops getting signatures.
The crosses represent the followup time for censored
observations (for which no further information is known
and thus the proportion of keys remains). This plot does
reflect the fact that many keys were dropped during the
1024-bits key removal (circa January 2015). Observed pro-
portion of keys being above the theoretical model from
year 3.5 to 6.5 years suggests that after three years the
keys wouldn’t be much likely to leave; at least not until
after 6.5 years, where the probability of remaining after-
wards is almost as the 50% chance of heads in a coin flip.
It is remarkably that keyring permanency doesn’t really go
below 50%, showcasing good health in the keyring.
As we mentioned, due to the 1024-bit key migration,
there is a clear skew that introduces a sharp drop around
6.5 years.
Fig. 5 Probability of people permanency. The black line follows
observed (non-parametric) data from the keyring, with crosses
representing the followup time for right-censored observations; the
red line is the parametric estimation; dotted lines represent
confidence bands
Figure 6 shows the people exits given one key in perpet-
ual risk, that is, if it is to remain in the keyring for all its
time span. The increasing steps from the non-parametric
exits is natural being the accumulated sum per tag of the
exits over remaining people ratios. The similarity from
previous plot is expected since cumulated hazard is a log-
arithmic transformation from survival function. We see
again that the observed plot lies below the theoretical
model starting from year 3.5 through year 6.5 (about 3
years), quickly increasing afterwards more than expected.
It is not until near year 3.5 that a someone is expected to
be half-way to go, which is better when compared to the
expected life of a subject being 5 years.
Figure 7 shows the departure rate is analogous to a
mortality rate. The observed behaviour suggest that com-
ing of age there’s a sudden increase on the risk i. e. keys
"wear out" to their age around year 5.5, certainly close
to the expected life. Yet the parametric departure rate
being under the non-parametric rate at the final years
shows the dramatic effect from the 1024 removal. Another
remarkably finding was that departure rate in general
gives empirical evidence to say that 7 out of 100 keys will
leave “any time now” (from the fact that hazard rate is
the instantaneous probability of failure at a specified time;
failure means, the probability of a key will completely
cease activity after a given time of life) in a 8 year lapse.
From Fig. 8 we see that the average number of signa-
tures received trend has a negative risk contribution. It
is noteworthy that coming of age, the risk contribution
starts to be positive by a bit, effectively showing the effect
of the hazard rate at later ages. The resulting effect was
that for each signature received by someone it reduces the
baseline risk by 0.83% on average.
Fig. 6 Cumulated hazard of people exits. The black line follows
observed (non-parametric) data from the keyring, with crosses
representing the followup time for right-censored observations; the
red line is the parametric estimation; dotted lines represent
confidence bands
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Fig. 7 Hazard rate of people exits. The black line follows observed
(non-parametric) data from the keyring, the red line is the parametric
estimation; dotted lines represent confidence bands
So how many signatures does someone needs to be
almost failure-proof? We found a minimal average num-
ber of 358 signatures are required to make up for a failure
risk statistically close enough to 0 (provided that the sub-
ject holds consistent and not by-chance interaction with
the people from said 358 signatures).
As a comparison, the max recorded average of sig-
natures received by a person was of 168.45 yielding an
absolute failure risk reduction of about 75.67% from the
baseline, and as expected, said person is indeed active; the
mean average of signatures received was of 11.82 yielding
an absolute failure risk reduction of about 9.45% from the
baseline.
Fig. 8 Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals for the Average Number of
Signatures Received. The black line follows the fitted trend for the risk
contribution from the avg. signatures received, the red dots are
observed risk contributions from the avg. signatures received at a
specific time; dotted lines represent confidence bands; colored areas
represent higher risk concentrations
In summary receiving 12 signatures (which is roughly
the expected average number of signatures received)
reduces the odds of exiting at any given time by 10%
from the baseline risk. In general people in the project
will constantly remain active for about 4.5 years, as
long as they went through 1.5 years. It is just after
six years where people effectively have an uncertain
end unless they interacted meaningfully with other peo-
ple: holding consistent relationship with at least 30% of
people in the keyring can almost guarantee a lifetime
membership.
6 Conclusions and future work
The Debian keyring is a very peculiar subset of the whole
OpenPGP Web of Trust analyzed in [11]. The work we
present here provides data empirically supporting the the-
oretical observations, particularly regarding the robust-
ness of what he defines as the LSCC (Largest Strongly
Connected Component). The migration away from 1024-
bit keys provided an opportunity to follow the progression
of the connectivity in our WoT after several of its hubs
were removed.
The preliminary results for this work have been shared
with a group of Debian developers. Historically, the usual
practice for key signing has been to generate non-expiring
signatures; people that have already cross-signed their
keys don’t have an incentive to refresh their trust. There is
an ongoing discussion as to whether this practice should
change towards time-limited signatures, better model-
ing ongoing social relationships, or to stick to current
practice.
The resulting survival analysis can be used to gen-
erate an objective measure for trust; this study was
done only on the Debian Developers keyring, it would
be interesting to compare with the more loosely con-
nected Debian Maintainers keyring. We also want to
further explain the keyrings by stratification. The sur-
vival analysis showcases good health of the Debian
Developers keyring (which makes up the mass of
Debian’s WoT).
Finally, themethodology followed for this study could be
applied to other free software projects, aiming to correlate
with events and trends spanning a wider population than
Debian’s; the applicability of our work to other projects,
however, depends on having a proper data set to base
the work off. As mentioned in Section 2.3, we are aware
of only one large project interested in formally structur-
ing a Curated Web-of-Trust keyring, but other data sets
could be taken as inputs - several authors have performed
studies based on the pattern of discussions in mailing
lists [40]; most of the analysis we presented here is based
on the observation of seven years of history, so it will
take a long time before this can be applied over other
data sets.
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Endnotes
1 For a WoT model to be able to scale beyond a small
number of participants, key servers (systems that store
and allow for retrieval of public key material) are needed.
The Synchronizing Key Server (SKS) network is the largest
network of OpenPGP key servers.
2While it is now known that public key cryptography
was invented by the UK Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the early 1970s, it was kept as
classified for over 25 years, which resulted in [14] being
widely credited for its invention and publication.
3An active key is required for most regular activities a
developer performs in Debian - Most notably, for upload-
ing packages and for voting in general resolutions.
4 The strong set is defined as the largest set of keys such
that for any two keys in the set, there is a path from one to
the other [41].
5 Some care should be taken interpreting the presented
graphs. Particularly, chosen colors are not equally strong
and visible against white background; mid-range (orange,
yellow) signatures appear weaker than red or blue ones.
Also, the drawing algorithm overlays lines, and in high
density areas, only the top ones prevail. Still, we believe
our observations to hold despite these caveats.
6Version control systems handle the concept of tags in a
repository: specific points of a project’s development that
are in some way relevant or significant; many projects use
tags to mark their releases. This is the case of the Debian
keyring maintainers’ repository: tags mark each keyring
version that was put in production. The team attempts to
put a new version in production roughly once a month.
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